would have been enough to dispel the misunderstanding so skillfully brought about, and it is regrettable that Mr. Pratt waited until page 167 to ask the question, "When one is mistaken but satisfied, does he know?"
To sum up, Mr. Pratt ably refutes all the arguments of the pragmatists which he examines. What he does not do, but what he might have done, is to make us realize that they are practically the same argument all the time. Pragmatists will certainly not consider themselves beaten by the many refutations; they will simply offer the same arguments under still other forms, and Mr. Pratt will have the trouble of a new refutation. In other words, instead of exposing various applications of the pragmatic method, the author ought to have exposed the method' itself; it would have been both shorter and more effective. It is of no use cutting off the heads of the monster, as they will grow as fast as they are cut: one must pierce his heart.
A word concerning the last two lectures. In the fifth, Mr. Pratt explains that while personally pragmatists have generally shown strong religious inclination, the strictly logical attitude of pragmatism toward religion should be skepticism; and in the sixth he expresses his regrets that pragmatism must ultimately favor low ideals in philosophy, that it must take us away from the Platonic, spiritual view of things. He does not like to see biologists apply their formulas to ethics, or 'scientific' psychologists account for our emotions and thoughts as if they were only physiological reactions. One might agree with Mr. Pratt that pragmatism ought theoretically to lead to such non-Platonic conceptions; but as a matter of fact, has he not shown himself in Lecture V that the actual affiliations of pragmatists are rather with theology than with materialism? So let us wait; pragmatism may be forgotten when the time for logical application comes.
Bryn Mawr College.
A. SCHimZ.
which compose this volume treat directly of the philosophy of politics, while the remaining essays contain a good many incidental observations on statesmen and statecraft, which further illustrate the author's mind in regard to the principles and methods of government. The book opens with the well-known Romanes lecture on Machiavelli, about whom it has long been impossible to say anything new, but whose system of thought remains as a touchstone and a challenge. Lord Morley does not side with those who balance his repulsive doctrines with his ardent patriotism. He treats him as a cool, dispassionate thinker, giving utterance to ideas held and applied before and after him, though never expressed with such unflinching power. Machiavelli studied human affairs with the passionless objectivity of the anatomist, rarely praising or blaming, rarely sorrowing or rejoicing, never pitying, never surprised. But this man of pure reason, "like most of those who take a pride in seeing human nature as it is, only saw half of it." "Machiavelli and his school saw only cunning, jealousy, perfidy, ingratitude, dupery; and yet on such a foundation they dreamed they could build. What idealist or doctrinaire ever fell into a stranger error?" Lord Acton in his famous introduction to the "Prince" has traced the wide acceptance of the Machiavellian philosophy by men of every race and creed down to our own day, and has reminded us that he is not a vanishing type but a constant and contemporary influence. But his creed is pure atavism, and Lord Morley has no sort of doubt that the fight is going against him. "Energy, force, will, violence still keep alive in the world their resistance to the control of justice and conscience, humanity and right, and Machiavelli represents one side in that unending struggle; but at the bottom of the outcry against him there has been the sound instinct that mankind are "far too profoundly concerned in right and wrong, mercy and cruelty, justice and oppression to favor a teacher who, even for a scientific purpose of his own, forgets the awful difference."
The essay on Guicciardini is naturally less concerned with the deeper problems of politics and morals; but the quotations from the "Ricordi" introduce us to the mind of a more careful observer than his great contemporary. The immense authority which his histories possessed for three centuries was upset in the work with which Ranke made his debut; but as his reputa-tion as a historian declined, his fame as an acute though cynical student of the changing fortunes of men and states has risen.
It is a relief to turn to the political thinkers of our own time who fill the latter part of this volume. They at least speak a language that we can understand, and are not ashamed to appeal to high principle for their enmities and enthusiasms. Modern publicists may and do differ in the intensity of their admiration for average human nature, but the rank cynicism of the Renaissance has gone forever. Our problem is no longer to build up a stable state on a foundation of pure selfishness, but to give play to the moral forces and spiritual possibilities inherent in civilized man. We know that society has made great progress, and we believe that it is capable of further progress if wisely guided; but is society being wisely guided? Is democracy, the fundamental fact of our time, a good form of government? Is it compatible with order and liberty? These questions are answered very differently by Mr. Lecky and Mr. Hobhouse, whose opinions are submitted to searching criticism in two essays of remarkable interest.
The appearance of Lecky's "Democracy and Liberty" in 1896 was no small surpise to a world which had only known him as a learned and judicial historian. There was, indeed, a good deal of useful information to be found in its pages; but it was passionate, dogmatic, superficial and partisan to an astonishing degree, and destroyed its author 's reputation as a thinker. The incompatibility of democracy and liberty is an old thesis, and democracy has been sharply criticised by such men as Maine and Fitzjames Stephen; but Lecky's attack was little more than the outpouring of the fears and prejudices of a midVictorian Whiggism which had outlived its day. Lord Morley's analysis of the book in the "Nineteenth Century" was crushing. Its mistakes in matters of fact were corrected, its extraordinary contradictions in thought were calmly pointed out. In one breath Lecky laments the extension of the suffrage, the destruction of the balance of power, the breakdown of the constitution; in the next he declares that the national character is good and is every day growing better.
No one knows better than Lord Morley that democracy has its special weaknesses and difficulties; but it has come to stay and we must make the best of it. This was the attitude of Tocqueville, and it is the attitude of most thoughtful men to-day.
How little Liberalism involves adulation of Demos is seen in Mr. Hobhouse's brilliant book, "Democracy and Reaction," which forms the text of the closing essay in this volume. Lecky had complained of the evil that democracy was doing; Mr. Hobhouse points out the dangers to which democracy is now exposed-a cheap and unscrupulous press, the influence of organized wealth, the appeal to bellicose passions, and to a blustering Imperialism. As Lecky's book was inspired by hatred of the Newcastle programme, so Mr. Hobhouse's essay was written under the stress of the Boer war. Lord Morley was a protagonist in both these chapters of English history, and he endorses Mr. Hobhouse 's conclusions and most of his arguments. His comment on the book will serve equally as a summary of his review of it. "We are sensible all the time of the pulse of a strong humanity and of that warm faith in social progress which is, in other words, faith in men, hope for men and charity for men."
The three remaining essays deal with Mr. Frederic Harrison's Byzantine romance "Theophano," " Comte's Calendar of Great Men," and "John Stuart Mill," the latter being the latest and ripest of Lord Morley's numerous tributes to his friend and master. Though their writings cover very different ground there is much in common between the two men, both in temperament and in ideas-the same dignity and disinterestedness, the same willingness to learn from experience, the same tempered faith in human nature, the same steadfast devotion to the public weal. It had been the intention of Professor Paulsen to publish, during his lifetime, the part of his memoirs dealing with his early youth and including his years at the Gymnasium, but he died before the plan could be carried out. After his death it was decided to extend the original scope of the autobiography, and the publishers have now printed the carefully prepared manuscript left by the author, which brings the narrative down to the beginnings of his career as an academic teacher. It is possible that the later portions, embracing the period of his
